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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff/Appellee, i 
V • i 
JOHN QUAS, l 
Defendant/Appellant. i 
\ Case No. 890601-CA 
* Priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Introduction 
The State regards this Court's initial unanimous decision 
affirming the conviction to be fundamentally sound, especially that 
part of the opinion concluding that the State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 
644 (Utah 1986), requirements for refiling the information had been 
met. 
The Court in its Order of August 27, 1991 has invited 
briefing on whether a circuit court finding of probable cause and 
a jury trial verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would 
render harmless an error at the preliminary hearing stage on the 
Brickev refiling issue. The answer is yes. The general rule found 
in numerous cases is that error at the preliminary hearing is 
harmless unless such error causes defendant to be prejudiced at 
trial. As explained below, if there were any such error in this 
case# the subsequent conviction should nonetheless stand under a 
harmless error analysis, and the Court accordingly would have a 
sufficient independent basis to affirm. 
However, the State respectfully suggests that the Court 
need not reach this harmless error question because the Brickev 
standard was so clearly met and exceeded in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED STATE V. 
BRICKEY IN ITS ORIGINAL DECISION. 
The State briefed the Brickev issue at length last year 
and invites the Court's review of those materials. The following 
supplements that argument to reaffirm conclusively the wisdom of 
this Court's original decision on this issue. 
In Brickey, unlike this case, the prosecution engaged in 
blatant judge shopping to secure a bindover of a case at a second 
preliminary hearing after the case had been dismissed based on 
precisely the same evidence presented to a different judge at the 
first preliminary hearing. The Utah Supreme Court, on 
interlocutory appeal, decided that "due process considerations" 
should limit refiling of charges previously dismissed for 
insufficient evidence. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647. 
To limit unfettered refiling, the Brickev Court, relying 
on Oklahoma authority, see Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Cr. 
App. 1971), required that, if possible, the same magistrate who 
dismissed at the first preliminary hearing preside over the second 
preliminary hearing. Brickev also adopted the following standard 
to justify a new information: Mnew or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." 
714 P.2d at 647 (emphasis added). By putting the standard in the 
2 
disjunctive "or", the Court recognized three bases for refiling: 
(1) new evidence; or (2) previously unavailable evidence; or (3) 
other good cause. 
Unlike Brickev, in this case there was no judge shopping* 
The same circuit court judge heard both preliminary hearings.1 
Moreover, the other three Brickev tests were met when only one of 
them needed to be satisfied. Indeed, this case is the polar 
opposite of what happened in Brickev. Any other conclusion based 
on the record in this case would radically alter the manner in 
which cases are prosecuted in this or any other state, effectively 
moving the double jeopardy bar from the empanelment of the jury at 
trial to the beginning of the preliminary hearing. 
A. New Evidence 
At the second preliminary hearing, the State presented 
through Kristine Knudson three statements made by the defendant 
after the first preliminary hearing. Although not outright 
confessions, the statements were relevant, material, and 
incriminating in that they conflicted sharply with defendant's 
previous explanations to law enforcement officials about the 
1
 Other jurisdictions have decided not to impose the 
restrictions on refiling adopted in Oklahoma. For example, in 
Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1976), the Wyoming Supreme 
Court described Jones v. State as a "judicial oddity, completely 
contrary to the vast majority." Id. at 1221. The Richmond court 
declared that the central purpose of the Oklahoma refiling cases 
was to curtail "magistrate shopping." Id. That also seemed to be 
the primary problem for the Brickey court, which suggests that the 
other refiling restrictions mentioned in Brickev should not be 
interpreted or applied onerously. In this case, the State was 
careful to ensure that the same magistrate heard the second 
preliminary hearing. 
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killing of his wife. 
By any measure, this was "new evidence" and, without 
anything more, satisfied the Brickev standard. Petitioner admits 
this point at page 6 of the petition for rehearing. The analysis 
easily could stop here. However, the State, to ensure not only 
that Brickev was met but also that there would be no question about 
probable cause at the second preliminary hearing, very thoroughly 
and professionally developed and presented further evidence that 
satisfied both the Brickev and probable cause standards. 
B. Previously Unavailable Evidence 
Unlike "new evidence," "previously unavailable evidence" 
needs further definition. Fortunately, case law authority supplies 
guidance. In Brickev, Justice Zimmerman declared that this 
requirement "places a relatively small burden on" the State. 
Brickev, 714 P.2d at 648. The Oklahoma cases, on which Brickev is 
based, are particularly instructive. 
In Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 484 P.2d 
891 (Okla. Cr. App. 1971), a case cited by the Brickev court, the 
court stated that evidence satisfying the refiling requirement 
includes "such evidence that with due diligence could have been 
available at the first preliminary examination." JDd. at 897. The 
reason to limit unbridled refiling, the court said, is so "the 
prosecutor may not take his dismissed case—with the same evidence-
-refile it—and submit it to a magistrate more likely to be 
favorable." Id. 
A case not previously cited to this Court that drives the 
4 
point home is Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142 (Okla. Cr. App. 1973). 
The State charged defendant with the offense of escape from prison. 
The case was dismissed at the first preliminary hearing due to 
insufficient evidence based on information contained in prison 
records. The charge was refiled after the State discovered that 
the prison records presented at the first preliminary hearing 
contained erroneous information. The defendant then was bound over 
and convicted at trial. The State could have discovered and 
presented the correct information at the first preliminary hearing. 
However, because the sufficient additional evidence "was, as a 
practical matter, not easily available to it at that time," the 
State's refiling of the case was affirmed. JId. at 1144 (emphasis 
added). The additional evidence meets the refiling standard if it 
could not have been "easily acquired" by the State. Id. at 1143. 
The previously unavailable evidence presented at the 
second preliminary hearing in this case required extraordinary "due 
diligence" (Harper) and plainly could not have been "easily 
acquired" (Chased. Obtaining it certainly required a great deal 
more time, effort, and resources than the mere correction of 
erroneous prison record information involved Iii Chase. For 
example, not only did Weber State Crime Lab Director James Gaskill 
and his assistants devote countless hours in and outside the 
laboratory conducting and analyzing tests with the murder weapon, 
this massive effort was the predicate for the State to offer 
previously unavailable expert opinion testimony at the second 
preliminary hearing. This evidence was not, as petitioner asserts 
5 
in his petition for rehearing (Pet. for rehearing at 5), "readily 
available to the State" in the first preliminary hearing.2 
Although the evidence offered through Mr. Gaskill is the 
prime example, the tests, exhibits, and other evidence developed 
and offered through Detective Edwards, neighbor Pam Young, State 
Crime Lab photographer David Farr, and the supplemented opinion 
testimony of Dr. Grey all, individually and collectively, far 
surpassed the "due diligence" test for additional evidence to be 
previously unavailable. To preclude the State from conducting such 
further investigation and tests for possible use in a refiled case 
on such a serious offense would cripple law enforcement in a way 
not remotely contemplated in Brickev. 
Even though Justice Zimmerman wrote that Brickev 
limitations would impose only "a relatively small burden" on the 
State, because the offense in the case is so serious, because the 
State thought probable cause was clearly established at the first 
preliminary hearing, and because the State knew that Brickev 
governed refiling, the State assumed a heavy burden rather than a 
small one in developing new or previously unavailable evidence to 
ensure that Brickev and probable cause requirements easily would be 
met. 
2
 Later in the petition (Pet. for rehearing at 7) , 
petitioner inexplicably and erroneously defines new or previously 
unavailable evidence as "evidence that was reasonably available at 
previous preliminary hearing(s)," a standard that conflicts with 
page 5 of the petition and that ignores Brickev, Harper, and Chase. 
Those cases call for the more practical and workable standard of 
whether due diligence was needed to acquire evidence not easily 
available to the State, in which case the evidence is considered 
previously unavailable under the refiling cases. 
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«(' „ Other Good Cause 
Ap,j in I, II I III f I il it'p supplying i r previously 
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groundless arid improvident prosecutions, !' State v, Anderson, : 
P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980). 
From the beginning of this case to the present the State 
has maintained strongly that sufficient evidence of probable cause 
was presented at the first preliminary hearing. If, arguendo, that 
is incorrect, an alternative good cause basis for the refiling 
remains based on the totality of circumstances surrounding this 
case. First, there was clearly an innocent miscalculation about 
the quantum of evidence the circuit court would require to bind 
over in this case, which this Court identified correctly in its 
June 18 opinion as at least a factor to be considered in the good 
cause analysis.3 Second, the State thoroughly and methodically 
investigated, developed, and presented at the second preliminary 
hearing substantial additional evidence that far exceeded probable 
cause. Third, defendant had ample opportunity to appeal the 
circuit court's rulings at the second preliminary hearing and 
failed to do so, instead proceeding to trial. Fourth, the evidence 
at trial, including the complete and devastating impeachment of 
defendant's testimony, caused the jury to convict defendant beyond 
a reasonable doubt for the homicide of his wife. Fifth, there is 
no evidence of the State shopping for a more favorable preliminary 
hearing magistrate or acting in any way otherwise than in a fair 
and professional manner towards the defendant. 
3
 Petitioner may be correct that innocent miscalculation as 
a good cause basis for refiling should not be allowed to 
"eviscerate" the "new or previously unavailable evidence" 
limitations, but petitioner is wrong to suggest that innocent 
miscalculation is irrelevant to the good cause analysis. Both 
Brickev and Harper rest the good cause basis on this ground, and 
this Court appropriately relied upon it in its June 18 opinion. 
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POINT I I 
ANY ERROR, IF FOUND, WOULD BE HARMLESS BECAUSE 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND DEFENDANT WAS FOUND AND 
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT AT TRIAL 
1 , , , , , , ' "'« , ' I ,-fhl "• W h P t t l ^ l ' V 
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l : t ! o I . M b 1 e C d | M I I1 I i i IIIIIII II | MI I j m i n i i ' i i i IIIIIII ,"i| i i | i | Il P F f a M ' S l l 
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t h e r e f i l i m q , II i i * * no has i s in t h e r e c o r d that , any Bin hi e r r o r 
t a i n t e d t i ie l a i r n e s s ill il I i IIIIIII II I II II i | m i m l i u ' i l II I  i l e l ' e n t l n n l IIIIIII 
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any way. Accordingly, any such error is harmless. 
A. Case Law Authority 
Many courts, state and federal, have held that errors at 
the preliminary hearing stage of a criminal prosecution are subject 
to a harmless error analysis following conviction at trial. The 
precedents are strong and clear. 
Federal law is well-established that a conviction will 
stand even though only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand 
jury that indicted him, Costello v. United States. 350 U.S. 359 
(1956)f or if there were other evidentiary errors at the indictment 
stage, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). See also United 
States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966) (fact grand jury presented with 
self-incriminating evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment does not bar prosecution). 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has declared that 
"it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record 
as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most 
constitutional violations . . . " United States v. Hastings, 461 
U.S. 499, 509 (1983). In fact, the Court has recognized the 
applicability of the harmless error principle where fundamental 
constitutional rights of a defendant are involved at the 
preliminary examination. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 
(1970), the Court required a harmless error analysis and refused to 
reverse defendant's conviction in spite of his being denied counsel 
at the preliminary examination in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
In reviewing Florida court proceedings, the Supreme Court 
10 
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N.W.2d 108, 110 (Wis. 1991). The defendant claimed his sixth 
amendment rights were violated through closure of the preliminary 
hearing. "[A] defendant who claims error occurred at his 
preliminary hearing may only obtain relief before trial." Id. 
Accord, State v. Noll. 467 N.W.2d 116 (Wis. 1991) (defendant, 
having failed to challenge his bindover through permissive 
interlocutory appeal, cannot challenge his conviction based on 
improperly admitted evidence at preliminary hearing). See also 
Whittv v. State. 149 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 1967), cert, denied. 390 U.S. 
959 (1968) (harmless error where defendant was improperly forced to 
waive his preliminary hearing in exchange for reduced bail). 
In a Pennsylvania decision this year, appellant's 
challenge to his conviction on the ground of constitutional error 
at the preliminary hearing was sharply rejected: "Once appellant 
has gone to trial and been found guilty of the crime, any defect in 
the preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial." Commonwealth v. 
Tyler, 587 A.2d 326 (Pa. Super. 1991). See Commonwealth v. 
McCullouah. 461 A.2d 1229 (Pa. 1983) (evidentiary deficiency at 
preliminary hearing immaterial when case proved at trial); 
Commonwealth v. Hess. 414 A.2d 1043, 1048 (Pa. 1980) (if evidence 
at trial is sufficient to be submitted to a jury, any deficiency in 
evidence at preliminary proceeding is harmless); Commonwealth v. 
Mianoana, 585 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 1990) (same). 
Last year the Supreme Court of Michigan held that "an 
evidentiary deficiency at the preliminary examination is not ground 
for vacating a subsequent conviction where the defendant received 
12 
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deprived i i n i I fit• i w 11-.»• i i i f f p r p d i">i'«p | I I C 1 I ~P H a 
result of: the error ot the preliminary examination People v, 
Astoi 11 ' 1985) (quoting People v. Pompa-
Ortiz, h* t I -111 "J 1 1
 r "J" I . | L - 1 1 1 J Hi ) | " ' , I , I • i » i M i j j -J 
685 I i il In in ml mi i I j i People v , Lof ink, 253 Cdl.R'f i 
3 8 4 I i | | I I I I I I I I I 
In hlftlm I UP Supreme Court reLunL.1 * IJIJLILIJ I I I lliiil 
4
 The California harmless' error approach
 app2^ e s to 
"irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are 
not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense." People v. Pompa-
Ortiz, 612 P.2d 941, 947 (Cal. 1980). The California Supreme Court 
has made clear that failure of evidence at the preliminary hearing 
is not a jurisdictional defect. M[W]ere it so, the jurisdictional 
exception would swallow the rule." People v. Alcala. 685 P.2d 
1126, 1138 (Cal. 1984). There can be no contention in this case 
that the lower courts lacked jurisdiction over defendant in this 
case, Brickev contemplates a second preliminary hearing, probable 
cause was shown, then, and only then was defendant held for trial. 
"[w]here an accused's constitutional rights are violated at a 
preliminary hearing, any error will be held harmless only if the 
court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did 
not affect the trial." State v. Flint, 761 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Idaho 
1988). Any challenge to the sufficiency of evidence at a 
preliminary hearing will be rejected "where at a fair trial the 
accused is found guilty upon sufficient evidence to sustain the 
verdict." State v. Streeoer. 747 P.2d 71, 73 (Idaho 1987). 
The Colorado courts similarly hold. "[A]ny issue as to 
the presence of probable cause is rendered moot by the jury's 
guilty verdict." People v. Alexander, 663 P.2d 1024, 1025 n.2 
(Colo. 1983). "Resolution of these questions must be made prior to 
trial in order to avoid the anomalous situation where a defendant 
may be found guilty at trial, and then attempt to have the 
conviction reversed for a preliminary hearing on probable cause." 
Kuvpers v. District Court, 534 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Colo. 1975). 
Although appellate courts in Utah have not addressed the 
precise issue posed in this Court's August 27, 1991 Order, the Utah 
Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1985), should be mentioned. Defendant argued on appeal that the 
probable cause statement in the arrest warrant was defective. 
However, assuming the probable cause statement was defective, the 
court followed "'the established rule that illegal arrest or 
detention does not void a subsequent conviction.'" JCd. at 271 
(quoting Gerstein v. Puqh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975)). 
14 
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A u « Ai I d i i l l . " M ( \\ , ' ' ' 1 r ^ ' " ' l p r i WBF p r n n n r 
because the Stal l " h • jjiovioutsly mid* «-J J I ril l* 
«"Mripnrer a^ ' " <' , : P . However, i i I i n w»- t *• ony e r r o r in 
,11
 t j I ii ruj.j 1 II ' I" f • J" li'iiii ihq(-iqiiPii! 1 ma 1 cniiviirt inn 
r e n d e r s any such e r ro i harmless in I i in I nil liab nevei L- I J I I IHHIHII 
11 ip «in i ip f i e l e n r v nf thn evidence to P I ill I i sh p robab le cause a t the 
in I i l im iua i j liiiaiuiy L I hi i bilauli ?h HIM I il llln ml i m i risoriak lie doubt 
at t r i a l Mm has he argued, or could he aiytie, Liii.il any b r r o i in 
i I lllliii iiiiji il In mi i I in l in II in ill Il i i teti the tai niesh of h i s t r i a l or 
I." in "i,3 judiced )i i ill ,i 11 airy wuy .""'" lib a resn 11,, i eg a i d J, es is il il n i iilt 11 tw 
of burden roi.i IIJI red foi showing harm or harmlessness and r e g a r d l e s s 
mi i n II ' i i II , in - ' i i i "I II in II II il  i in i I n : j i i n the record i n th i s case si mp] y 
does not permit any other conclusioi i tl lai I I,:I i 3 e i: re :i : :i 1 1 
allowing the refiling was beiuyn. 
CONCLUSION 
For 11" •• foregoing reasons „, "onit bl'ioun. a I. J 1 1 ia 
defendant's conviction. On . the Bricke^ Issui., die conviction 
In Schreuder, the court noted that the "only prejudice to 
the defendant resulting from what may have been an invalid arrest 
was that period of detention he experienced prior to preliminary 
examination and judicial determination of probable cause for trial. 
In light of his subsequent conviction, that temporary period of 
possibly wrongful detention is of minimal significance and does not 
warrant reversal of an otherwise valid conviction." 712 P.2d at 
272. £f. State v. Kellv, 718 P.2d 385, 392-94 (Utah 1986). In 
this case, any error in allowing the refiling could not have 
prejudiced defendant at al1 because he was not detained in 
connection with the second preliminary hearing until the circuit 
court found that probable cause had been established, a finding 
that defendant has not and, based on the evidence presented, could 
not dispute. 
should be affirmed because there was no error in allowing the 
refiling of this case and because if there were any such error it 
was harmless. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /&- day of October, 1991. 
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